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BANKRUPTCY: THE LEGAL WHIPPING BOY
JOSEPH V. COSTA*
From its inception, the Constitution has given Congress the ex-
clusive power to regulate bankruptcy.' While federal bankruptcy laws
were only operative for a total of 16 years prior to 1898,2 since that
time the law has often been amended but never repealed." The admin-
istration of the bankruptcy laws without major criticism or scandal
throughout these 75 years bears witness to the success of the present
system in achieving its raison d'etre - the wiping out of the debts of
an overburdened debtor in order to give him a new start and thereby
benefit society as a whole.
To both the legal profession and the general public, bankruptcy
is a Pandora's box which they fear to open lest they be overwhelmed
in legal mumbo jumbo, red tape and a confrontation with moral prin-
ciples. However, an efficient, economical administration of a viable
bankruptcy law is of increasing importance to the social and economic
foundations of our culture. At the height of the Depression in 1932,
there were nearly 70,000 cases of bankruptcy in the United States.4 In
1963, approximately one of every 1000 persons in the United States
filed a petition in bankruptcy." For the year ending June 30, 1974, all
categories of bankruptcies rose 9.4 percent to a total of 189,513. 6 My
day-to-day experience indicates that these figures are continuing to rise
at a rapid rate.
With these considerations in mind, the Commission on the Bank-
ruptcy Laws of the United States (the Commission) was established to
consider the philosophy of bankruptcy, causes of bankruptcy, possible
alternatives to the present bankruptcy administration - including the
O Bankruptcy Judge for the Eastern District of New York.
1 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
2 McCarty, Federal Bankruptcy or State Court Receivership, 48 MARQ. L. REv. 340
(1964).
s Congress has periodically amended the Bankruptcy Act. The years 1903, 1910, 1926,
and 1952 saw substantial amendment but the only major revision was the Chandler Act
of 1938. Minor changes were also made in 1917, 1922, 1950, 1956, and 1966. Virtually every
year, Congress makes additional insubstantial amendments to meet current needs. See
Bateman, Recent Developments in Bankruptcy, 32 Mo. L. REv. 1, n.1 (1967). See also Note,
The Proposed New Bankruptcy Act, 7 Ian. L. REv. 852, n.3 (1974).
4D. STANLEY & M. Gn-Tn, BANKRUPTCY: PROBLEM, PRocEss, REFoRm 18-20 (1971) [here-
inafter cited as BRooImNGs REPORT].
5 See id. at 25.
6 N.Y. Times, Sept. 20, 1974, at 36, col. 2. See also REPORT OF THE CO MmISSION ON THE
BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNrrED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., Ist Sess., pt. I,
at 1 (1973) [hereinafter cited as COMIaSSION REPORT].
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application of advanced management techniques- and, most impor-
tantly, to analyze, evaluate and recommend changes in the existing
bankruptcy laws.7
At the outset, I must note that in many respects the Commission
did meet its stated goals. This is especially true where the proposed
act codifies decisional law and quiets differences between the courts of
appeals on matters which have not yet reached the Supreme Court. I
also salute with the greatest personal appreciation the dedication and
unselfish work which the members of the Commission put forth in
their effort. They worked long hours and served completely without
compensation. However, my friends on the Commission would be the
first to criticize me, and I would lose their respect if I did not speak
my piece on those points where I believe they seriously missed their
objectives. Upon careful inspection of the Commission's work product,
it became apparent to me that the Commission had in the proposed
Bankruptcy Act of 1973 (the Commission's Act)8 lost sight of the ob-
jectives of the bankruptcy laws which had been in force in England
for more than four centuries and in the United States for over 75 years.
The Commission had fallen prey to the "blame-the-court" syndrome
currently in vogue, and as a result bankruptcy was made the legal
"whipping boy."
7 Pub. L. No. 91-354 (1970). The congressional hearings, which ultimately led to the
creation of the Commission, produced a series of findings. Among them were:
1) A dramatic increase in the number of bankruptcies since World War II was
seriously overloading the court system.
2) Nearly half of the bankruptcy court operation funds were spent on no-asset
or nominal asset cases which could be handled more economically as nonadversary
summary proceedings.
3) Current practices did not effectively protect creditors, who generally found it
much more practical to raise prices than to try to collect debts in bankruptcy
court.
4) In light of the large numbers of nondischargeable and secured debts, debtors
were also not effectively protected.
5) Bankruptcy courts generally lacked uniform procedures, thus denying equal
treatment.
6) Many functions now performed by lawyers could be performed by nonlegal
personnel at a lower cost.
COM iISsON REPORT, supra note 6, pt. I, at 2-5.
The Commission consisted of nine members, three of them appointed by the Presi-
dent. Each house of Congress had two appointees to the Commission, one from each
political party. The remaining two members were appointed by the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court. A report of the Commission's activities was to be submitted to the
President, Chief Justice, and Congress within two years of the enactment of the bill, Pub.
L. No. 91-354 (1970).
8The report of the Commission consisted of two parts: Part I contains the actual
findings and Part II includes the proposed bill, accompanied by the Commission's notes.
COSMUssSoN REPRT, supra note 6. The Commission's bill has been introduced in both
houses of Congress. Proposed Bankruptcy Act of 1973, S. 2565, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973),
H.R. 10792, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) [hereinafter cited as Commission's Bill]. See gen-
erally Kennedy, The Report of the Bankruptcy Commission: The First Five Chapters
Of The Proposed New Bankruptcy Act, 49 IND. L.J. 422 (1974).
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Reacting to the deficiencies of the Commission's Act, the National
Conference of Bankruptcy Judges concluded that the proposal required
more than piecemeal amendments. It thus set out to draft an entirely
new bill to accomplish this end. A committee was formed, and a com-
prehensive study and analysis was made. Suggestions were solicited
and received not only from Conference members, but also from the
bar and from interested outside organizations. A draft was submitted
to the entire Conference membership, and after a mid-year meeting,
a second proposed act, the Judges' Bill, resulted. The bill was intro-
duced in the House of Representatives on September 12, 1974.9
While a detailed analysis of the two bills is not intended, it is
hoped that a discussion of some of the relative strengths and weaknesses
of the two proposals will aid in the current debate facing the Congress.
THE CRY FOR REFOR
Some years ago, there began to develop a public trend in which
many of the economic ills besetting the nation were blamed on the
bankruptcy laws. In my opinion much of this improperly directed
criticism was the result of misleading treatment given the problem by
the news media. An early forerunner in this movement was an article
appearing in the May 1966 issue of Reader's Digest, entitled "Planned
Bankruptcy: The Racket That Cheats Us All." Highlighted in red ink
read the subtitle: "Loopholes in our bankruptcy law enable swindlers
to fill their pockets - and rob consumers of millions of dollars a day."
The article outlined the activities of conniving thieves expert in "scam"
operations. 10 The article implied that these swindles continued with
impunity.
However, the facts narrated and the cases cited attested to the effi-
cacy of the existing procedures. Through the alertness of creditors, the
power of the bankruptcy court may be invoked through the filing of
an involuntary petition in bankruptcy." Thus, the investigatory powers
9 H.R. 16643, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) [hereinafter cited as Judges' Bill].
10 Surface, Planned Bankruptcy: The Racket That Cheats Us All, READER's DiGmEr,
May 1966, at 125. The Brookings Report describes a "scam" operation as one in which
a criminal element either sets up a business or takes over an existing business with estab-
lished credit ratings. Once in control, it proceeds to purchase large quantities of goods
on credit, then absconds. It is not the racketeer but the creditor who then invokes the
powers of the bankruptcy courts in this type of situation. BROOXUNGS REPORT, supra note 4,
at 111-12. See Davidson, Schemes and Methods Used in Perpetrating Bankruptcy Frauds,
71 Com. L.J. 383 (1966) (discussion of the activities of the Department of Justice in this
area).
11 Bankruptcy Act § 59(b), 11 U.S.C. § 95(b) (1970). The section provides where three
or more creditors have a claim against the debtor exceeding $500 above the value of any
collateral held by them, an involuntary petition may issue for the purpose of adjudicating
[V/ol. 49:52
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of the trustee are activated, which may result in a referral by the bank-
ruptcy court of the alleged criminal activity to the United States At-
torney. For example, frauds committed in In re Murray Packing Co.,12
cited in the article, resulted in the conviction of six individuals. Like-
wise, in a Philadelphia case described in the article, the defendants were
ultimately convicted of conspiracy and concealing assets.1 3 Most of
these activities are equally violative of state larceny laws. Unfortunately,
local agencies are often ill-equipped to investigate and prosecute this
type of crime.
The importance of this type of criminal activity on the adminis-
tration of the bankruptcy laws may be somewhat overstated. As the
Commission ultimately noted in its July 1973 report:
Notwithstanding the notoriety of "scam" bankruptcies, absconding
and concealing debtors, and other instances of egregious conduct
in, and in anticipation of, cases under the Act, the Commission
has found little empirical substantiation that dishonest conduct is
a cause of bankruptcy in a significant number of cases.' 4
Complaints are also heard from the banking community that loan
losses are due to lax bankruptcy laws which permit debtors to wipe
out their obligations by a mere scheduling in bankruptcy. The in-
crease in bankruptcy filings is attributed to a reversal in trend from
the original view of bankruptcy as a means of creditor control to the
current concept of relief for the honest debtor. This, the bankers com-
plain, is the encouragement of immorality and the undermining of
an important phase of the banking business. Often, however, the bank-
ing institutions themselves are to blame for the ills that beset them.
In large business filings, bankruptcy judges frequently discover that
loans were made without checking the financial conditions of the
business. For example, the bank has failed to determine if the bor-
rower has paid his taxes, especially withholding and social security
taxes. In many cases, the hidden purpose of the loan is to pay those
taxes, and when the borrower's petition is filed, the schedules indi-
cate large tax liabilities which have priority over other debts.
One only need turn on the radio or television to learn that he
can furnish his kitchen or living room or be the proud possessor of
the debtor bankrupt. A single creditor may initiate proceedings if the total number of
creditors is less than twelve, and the $500 requirement is met. In the single creditor peti-
tion, the $500 may include unliquidated debts.
12200 F. Supp. 16 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), rev'd sub nom., Sahn v. Pagano, 302 F.2d 629 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 371 US. 819 (1962).
lsSurface, Planned Bankruptcy: The Racket That Cheats Us All, READER's DIGESr,
May 1966, at 125, 128.
14 COMMLSsoN REPORT, supra note 6, pt. I, at 53-54.
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a color television if he visits his friend at the nearest bank. The ease
with which consumer credit is extended is, in my opinion, a contrib-
uting factor in many bankruptcies. I suggest that corrective banking
legislation might better serve to alleviate unnecessary bankruptcies
than some of the so-called bankruptcy reforms.
In 1965, at the suggestion of the federal judiciary, the Brookings
Institution undertook a research study in the field of bankruptcy. 5 No
serious study of bankruptcy administration had been made for over
twenty years. Contributions to the study were made by Vern Country-
man of the Harvard Law School and other noted legal scholars. How-
ever, their degree of expertise in bankruptcy law was by no means
uniform. For example, David T. Stanley, director of the study, ad-
mitted that his experience in "the field of bankruptcy is relatively
new."' 6
One crucial finding of the Brookings Institution report (Brookings
report), which to my knowledge was not and cannot be substantiated,
is the alleged "accommodation" between the district court judge and
15 BROOKINGS REPORT, supra note 4, at 219. The Brookings Institution is "an inde-
pendent organization devoted to nonpartisan research, education, and publication in eco-
nomics, government, foreign policy, and the social sciences generally." Id. at v.
The findings of the Brookings Report include:
1) Personal bankruptcies have increased greatly in number since World War II,
often occurring after threats by creditors to bring legal proceedings.
2) Business bankruptcies, often resulting from poor management under unfavor-
able market conditions, have also increased but at a slower rate.
8) The average personal bankrupt is a blue-collar worker making more than
$5,000 per year.
4) While bankruptcy is generally socially disapproved, the bankrupts, themselves,
have mixed attitudes ranging from bitterness and shame to relief.
5) Notwithstanding uniform federal law, its application varies from court-to-
court and state-to-state.
6) The rehabilitation chapters are rarely utilized and when employed are not
effective.
7) Bankrupts have no special problems obtaining new credit.
8) The major cause underlying the rise in personal bankruptcies is increased
personal indebtedness, and, to some extent, unemployment.
9) Bankruptcies have no substantial effect on the economy.
10) Creditors realize little from bankruptcy proceedings and, therefore, often do
not bother to participate but instead pass the losses along in higher prices.
11) The bankrupt's attorneys typically "handle their cases routinely, unimagina-
tively, and often unexpertly."
12) The bankruptcy system is poorly managed without sufficient supervision or
record keeping, leading to error and fraud.
18) Bankruptcy personnel are often nonqualified or under-trained.
14) Roughly 70 percent of all bankruptcy cases have no assets after exempt prop-
erty has been set aside. Of the remaining 80 percent, administrative costs con-
sume a large portion of the assets.
15) There is no justification for the bankruptcy proceeding to be self-supporting,
especially since no other federal legal proceeding must meet this requirement.
16) Creditor priorities are illogical.
17) Bankrupts are often harassed into reviving discharged debts.
Id. at 2-4.




the bankruptcy judge, his ap'pointee. 17 I have spent over 30 years of
my professional life in the practice of criminal law in the federal
courts and now 11 years on .the bench of the bankruptcy court and
I have never heard even a rumor of such an accommodation. As the
Honorable Edward Weinfeld noted in his separate statement accom-
panying the Commission's report:
The reasons advanced by the majority for the establishment of a
separate bankruptcy court and for the appointment of judges by the
President in lieu of the present referee system are based upon erro-
neous assumptions which are contrary to my experience as a United
States District Court Judge for almost a quarter of a century....
This assumption is without factual support. The majority also ac-
cepts the view that the relationship between the referee and a review-
ing district court judge tends to undermine the integrity of the
judicial process; that a district court judge is unlikely to reverse an
appointee and so reviews or appeals are discouraged. This premise,
based upon "impression or belief," again is groundless and im-
properly gives credibility to an argument that a United States
District Judge will render decisions on review based on his rela-
tionship to the referee whose decision is uider review rather than
on the merits of the issue before-him. The assumption has as little
force to it as would a claim that the court of appeals would hesitate
to reverse a district court judge because he was known to the
members of the panel....
I do not believe, based on my experience in my own busy
metropolitan district, which has seven full-time referees, that attor-
neys are supine or that any reputable attorney would forbear to file
what he considered a meritorious review of a referee's order for fear
of incurring a referee's displeasure. Equally groundless are the
assumptions which attribute to the referees and judges lack of im-
partiality based on the present method of appointment ....
Unquestionably the judges of the district court appoint referees
on the basis of their competency, merit and fitness for the position..
And while judges are aware of the competency of individual referees
when reviewing their orders, this circumstance would appear to be
no more than a factor in making their decisions on review than the
regard for the competency of district judges by the circuit courts
on appeal from decisions of district court judges.
Finally if we are to be guided by experience, appointment of
the bankruptcy judge by the President, with the advice and consent
of the Senate, would result in undue delay in refilling positions
when vacancies occur.s
17 BRooKmms Rsnor, supra note 4, at 219.
18 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 6, pt. I, at 299-300 (footnote omitted).
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Judge Weinfeld agreed with the Commission's recommendation
that the administrative and judicial functions now performed by bank-
ruptcy judges be separated and that the administrative functions be
transferred to a separate agency. However, he dissented from the
proposal to create a separate bankruptcy court with judges appointed
by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, for a term
of fifteen years. 19 He further concluded in his dissent that "[t]he ref-
eree system has worked well and efficiently through the years and I
find no justifiable reason for a change which would add another tier
of judges to the federal judicial system." 20
It was the Brookings report that triggered the creation of the
Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws. Prior to the publication of the
report of the Commission on July 30, 1973, those of us who were
interested in the progress and development of the Commission's work
attended seminars on that subject. My recollection of those lectures is
that we were being assured that while some of the points made by
the Brookings report were valid, most were not. The Commission,
we were told, would effectuate a balance. I must frankly state my
personal conclusion that the Commission's proposed act, save for a
very few instances, is a capitulation to Brookings.
The reason for the failure of the Commission's Act to meet cur-
rent needs for adjustments in procedure may be traced to the very
composition of the Commission. While two distinguished members of
the judiciary were members of the body, there was not one bankruptcy
judge.21 Of the 24 consultants listed in the Commission's report, 18
are professors, one a consumer advocate, one a computer processing
expert, three lawyers but again, not one bankruptcy judge. Thus, the
opinions of those who are closest to the problems were all but ignored.
I am aware that members of the Commission interviewed or consulted
with and received suggestions from bankruptcy judges and practitioners.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 This deficiency has been ascribed as a basic reason for the failure of the Com-
mission's proposed bill to meet current needs for adjustments in procedures and codifica-
tion of substantive rights and obligations. See, e.g., Cyr, The Bankruptcy Act of 1973:
Back to the Drafting Board, 48 Am. BANm. LJ. 45, 46-47 (1974). Those appointed by the
Chief Justice were the Hon. Hubert L. Will, United States District Judge for the Northern
District of Illinois, and the Hon. Edward Weinfeld, United States District Judge for the
Southern District of New York and Chairman of the Bankruptcy Committee of the
Judicial Conference of the United States. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 6, pt. I, at v.
The Commission was also condemned for not having included a practicing business
bankruptcy attorney on the panel itself and for having used only one such attorney as a
consultant. Phelan, The Proposed Bankruptcy Administration (The "FBA") - Bureau-




However, their numbers were few and those who had been consulted,
with whom I have spoken, indicate that their suggestions were in the
main ignored.22
Thus, the recent proposal of the National Conference of Bank-
ruptcy Judges, the Judges' Bill, deserves careful consideration as a
possible answer to some of the excesses of both Brookings and the
Commission.
SALIENT FEATURES OF THE REFORM PROPOSALS
Judicial and Administrative Structure
Currently, the federal district courts have original jurisdiction in
bankruptcy matters.23 Judicial matters are handled by the district court
judges and their appointed referees, known as bankruptcy judges.
Bankruptcy judges, in conjunction with receivers and trustees, handle
the complex administrative matters accompanying an adjudication of
bankruptcy.24
22 Suggestions were made and papers and treatises were submitted by, among others,
the Hon. John Lee, Bankruptcy Judge for the Eastern District of Kentucky, and President
of the National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges, in a comprehensive study published
and printed in November 1971, with an acknowledgment by Senator James 0. Eastland,
Chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary for the United States Senate, for the use of
the Commission. Similarly available were contributions made by my confreres, Bankruptcy
Judges Daniel R. Cowans and Asa Herzog. Judge Herzog suggested a well-qualified admin-
istrative assistant be appointed to aid each bankruptcy judge, functioning to narrow the
matters requiring judicial determination before referring them to the judge. It was sug-
gested that this assistant be a qualified lawyer, and that he receive a competitive salary.
None of these proposals was accepted by the Commission.
23 Bankruptcy Act § 2(a), 11 U.S.C. § 11(a) (1970).
24In navigating the procedural aspects of the adjudication, the bankruptcy judge
provides substantial guidance to the parties. For example, property involved in bankruptcy
proceedings is often income producing and it is his duty to apportion equitably the divi-
dends. If an appeal is sought from his determination, it is the bankruptcy judge's function
to prepare the necessary records. Bankruptcy Act § 39(a), 11 U.S.C. § 67(a) (1970). The
number of judges and their territories is determined by the Conference of Circuit Judges
pursuant to the recommendations of the Director of the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts. Id. at § 34(a), 11 U.S.C. § 62(a). See also Bankruptcy Rules § 901(7)
(1973).
Besides the bankruptcy judge's administrative duties, he also renders assistance to
the district court judge, and at times performs some of the functions of the district court
judge. The bankruptcy judge's jurisdiction is limited to that prescribed in the Act, and
is subject to review by the court. See In re Tom Moore, Inc., 179 F. Supp. 285 (E.D. Tenn.),
aff'd sub nom., Scott v. Maco Warehouse Corp., 273 F.2d 162 (6th Cir. 1959) (per curiam).
The bankruptcy judge has broad judicial powers. Petitions for relief referred to him
are either adjudicated or dismissed in his discretion. During the hearing he may admin-
ister the oath to witnesses and require the production of evidence. In certain instances it
is in his power to receive or release the bankrupts property. It is within his discretion
to grant, deny or revoke discharges and confirm arrangements or wage earner plans. He
may also revoke plans or reinstate bankruptcy proceedings. Bankruptcy Act § 38, 11 U.S.C.
§ 66 (1970).
Under the Commission's proposed bill the office of bankruptcy judge is abolished.
The United States Bankruptcy Administration would handle the administrative functions
19741
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The Judges' Bill calls for the creation of separate bankruptcy
courts. 25 Subject matter jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts would
extend to all civil bankruptcy cases. 28 Further, all civil actions, whether
in state or federal courts, which would contain bankruptcy issues and
which could have originally been brought in the bankruptcy court
could be removed to the bankruptcy court by either plaintiff or de-
fendant for determination of those issues.27 When proceedings are
commenced in more than one bankruptcy court involving the same
or related debtors, the court with the first petition will make the deter-
mination as to the court in which the action will proceed. 28 The bank-
ruptcy courts, however, would have no jurisdiction over criminal ac-
tions other than contempt for violation of their own orders.29
The bankruptcy courts would be governed by specified portions
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure unless inconsistent with rules
promulgated by the Supreme Court.80 Among its procedural provisions,
the Judges' Bill specifically grants standing to intervene in a bank-
ruptcy proceeding to any person with "a direct and substantial in-
terest."8' The right to a trial by jury would remain substantially the
same as under current law82 but with one important change. Under
of the bankruptcy judge. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 6, pt. I, at 120-21. The Com-
mission's proposal is based on the belief that conflicts of interest permeate the present
procedure. It is contended that the bankruptcy judge cannot fairly monitor the trustee's
actions where the bankruptcy judge has the power of appointment. In addition, the
Commission condemned bankruptcy judge's involvement with the bankruptcy bar as not
conducive to the "proper performance of the judicial function."
The Judges' Bill seeks to alleviate these conflicts by increasing the term of office to
fifteen years. This would remove any dependence upon the bar for employment once the
term ended. Judges' Bill, supra note 9, at § 2-102(b). See also CoMMIssIoN REPORT, supra
note 6, pt. I, at 95. Similarities in the role of bankruptcy judge continue between the
existing law and the proposed Judges' Bill. These range from the power to decide volun-
tary and involuntary petitions to the admission of exemptions. Determining the enforce-
ability of claims and deciding objections to the discharge also continue as his duties.
See Judges' Bill, supra note 9, at §§ 2-201(a)(1), (2), (4). An important improvement advo-
cated by the Judges' Bill deals with the appointment of the trustee. Previously within
the referee's sole discretion, the Judges' Bill only permits the appointment of the trustee
by the Director. This would alleviate any impropriety alleged by the Commission. Id.§ 4-302(a).
25 Judges' Bill, supra note 9, at § 2-101.
26 See id. at § 2-201. See also Commission's Bill, supra note 8, at § 2-201.
27 Judges' Bill, supra note 9, at § 2-202.
28 Id. § 2-203(a)(5). All other actions will be stayed pending the determination. The
court is to consider the interests of justice and the convenience of the parties. Id.
29 Id. § 2-201(d).
so Id. §§ 2-204(a), (b). The rule-making authority of the Supreme Court is contained
in 28 U.S.C. § 2075 (1970).
81 Judges' Bill, supra note 9, at § 2-205(a).
82id. § 2-206; Bankruptcy Act § 19, 11 U.S.C. § 42 (1970).
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the current act a person against whom an involuntary petition has been
filed has a specific right to a jury trial on the question of his insol-
vency. Under the Judges' Bill all involuntary petition cases would be
tried by the bankruptcy judge without a jury; the judge is empowered,
however, to empanel a jury on motion or on his own initiative.3 Bank-
ruptcy court judgments would be reviewable by the court of appeals.3 "
The Judges' Bill also contains provisions governing the structure
of the bankruptcy courts. The number, location, and territorial bound-
aries of the courts would be designated by Congress pursuant to the
recommendations of the Judicial Conference of the United States. 5
The Judges' Bill further provides that the Director of the Branch of
Bankruptcy Administration shall review the number and location of
bankruptcy courts at the direction of the Judicial Conference. 6 How-
ever, a bankruptcy court's jurisdiction would not be limited to its
territorial boundaries in any matter properly before it.7
Under the system of independent bankruptcy courts proposed by
the Judges' Bill, the judicial council of each circuit would appoint
the bankruptcy judges. 8 These judges would serve for terms of fifteen
years with mandatory retirement at age seventy, or earlier if a judge
becomes permanently incapable of future performance of his duties.39
During the term of office, a bankruptcy judge is removable "only for
incapacity, misconduct, or neglect of duty."40 Removal proceedings
would be initiated by a report of possible wrongdoing from the Direc-
tor of the Branch of Bankruptcy Administration to the Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court who would in turn appoint a federal judge to
investigate the allegations. If sufficient facts are found to warrant issu-
ance of a complaint, the Chief Justice would then appoint a commis-
sion composed of three federal judges other than the investigating
8 Judges' Bill, supra note 9, at § 2-206(a).
84Id. § 2-209(a). The Commission's Bill provides for appeals to the nearest district
court, thus adding an extra and unnecessary layer to the appeal process. Commission's
Bill, supra note 8, at § 2-210(a)(3).
85Judges' Bill, supra note 9, at § 2-105. Under the Commission's Bill, the Judicial
Conference would determine the number, location, and territorial boundaries. Commis-
sion's Bill, supra note 8, at § 2-105(b).
86Judges' Bill, supra note 9, at § 2-105(a). The Director of the Administrative Office
of the United States Courts now performs a similar function with respect to the numbers
and territories of the referees. Bankruptcy Act § 87, II U.S.C. § 65 (1970).
87 Judges' Bill, supra note 9, at § 2-105(c). See also id. § 1-103, which provides that
the bankruptcy courts will have jurisdiction if the debtor "resides or has a domicile, place
of business, or property within the United States including its territories and possessions."
8 Id. § 2-102(a). See 28 U.S.C. § 382 (1970).
89 Judges' Bill, supra note 9, at § 2-103(a).
401 d. § 2-102(d).
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judge to preside over a formal hearing on the charges. If an order of
termination of appointment is issued, it would be appealable in the
same manner as a judgment of a federal district court.41
Recognizing the importance of competitive salaries to attract high
quality personnel, the Judges' Bill deals extensively with compensation
and benefits. 42 Basically, bankruptcy judges would receive the same
41 Id. The Commission's Bill contains a similar provision. Commission's Bill, supra
note 8, at § 2-102(e).
42 Judges' Bill, supra note 9, at § 2-102 et seq. Recently, Congress had occasion to pass
upon the recommendation of the Presidential Committee on Salaries which urged in-
creases for the executive, legislative, and judicial branches. Bankruptcy judges would have
received only a two percent increase. Through the efforts of Senator Mansfield, majority
leader of the Senate, even that paltry increase was thwarted. When he was questioned
about his actions, Senator Mansfield's reply was: "My heart bleeds for the U.S. Judiciary.
They don't have to keep their jobs if they don't want them. They can retire, and there
are hundreds to take their jobs." N.Y. Times, Mar. 7, 1974, at 17, col. 1. In answer to these
remarks this author wrote to the Senator on March 14, 1974. The letter read in part:
I state that my feeling is one of regret because the remarks are made by one who
is a recognized national leader of the party to which I gave my allegiance and
most of my efforts before being limited from further active participation by an
Act labeled "Hatch" and the Judicial Canons of Ethics.
I have no knowledge as to the accuracy of the quotes, and if you have been
misquoted, there is an apology due you and a retraction should be published. If the
quotes are correct and reflect your sentiments, then I believe you owe some ex-
planation to *the judiciary. Just to think that these are men and women appointed
with the advice and consent of the Senate. . . . I do . . . respectfully suggest
that to belittle or impugn the dedication, industry and loyalty of the judiciary
and to infer a mercenary motivation to their labors neither justifies your position
nor adds to the public desire of harmony among the three branches of govern-
ment.
Being at the bottom of the totem pole in the echelon of importance, I don't
attempt to reply in behalf of nor make the case for the judicary. The matter of
the justification of the raise, either legal or moral, is not at issue here in view
of the legislative action already taken -nor need I emphasize that not having
received an increase for over five years in the face of galloping inflation is just
as difficult to understand to a judge as it is to a laborer. His wife goes to the
same supermarket and his children seek the same costly education. However, as
an individual, I cannot help but be moved to resentment by your remarks, which
must convey your inner feelings and attitude. Much to my surprise, if such is the
attitude of one who knows, then what can we expect from those who are ig-
norant or those who are anxious to undermine and belittle our institutions?
As for your statement that they should resign, "hundreds are waiting to take
their jobs," I have no doubt that there is a reservoir of incompetents who are
ready to grab, but I am sure that the public is not, nor do I believe are you upon
sober reflection, ready to compromise on the quality of our judges. Also, I have
no doubt that a discussion with some of your colleagues will confirm the fact
that because of the remuneration offered, they have been finding it more difficult
to obtain competent and highly-respected members of the legal profession suc-
cessful in their private practice to accept appointment to the federal bench. I
cannot equate quantity with quality in an office as sensitive as a federal judge-
ship.As to their mercenary proclivities, I have the pleasure and the honor of
working with, and therefore being able to attest to the competence and ability
of many members of the judiciary. All of these men and women would be able
to earn, if not double, then quadruple their present salary if engaged in private
practice. Of particular notice should be the service of the judges who take senior
status upon retirement.
The Honorable Harold R. Medina, J. Edward Lumbard and Leonard P.
Moore, Senior Circuit Judges, and the Honorable Leo F. Rayfiel, Sylvester J.
[Vol. 49:52
BANKRUPTCY
compensation as the judges of the tax courts,43 and would be entitled
to the same benefits as persons covered by the civil service retirement
laws"
The Commission's proposal also calls for the establishment of sepa-
rate bankruptcy courts,45 not equal in status to the district courts as
the Judges' Bill has proposed, but rather on a lower level. Appeals
would be made to the district courts, thereby giving the unsatisfied
party three levels of appeal. 46 It has been suggested that the Bankruptcy
Administration would divide the judicial and administrative functions
in a manner similar to the system now employed by the Internal Rev-
enue Service and the tax courts.47
The Commission's proposed act envisions the establishment of an
entirely new layer of civil servants to administer bankruptcy proceed-
ings, usurping much of the role now given to bankruptcy judges. 48
To a substantial degree, this would transfer bankruptcy proceedings
from interested creditor control to administrative control. Under the
Commission's system, bankruptcy matters would be handled by an in-
dependent agency, the United States Bankruptcy Administration, under
the auspices of the executive branch.49 Under the Commission's plan
Ryan, Walter Bruchhausen and John R. Bartels, Senior District Court Judges, to
mention but a few in our circuit and districts, all and each of whom could retire
at full pay and are physically and mentally capable to earn at least an additional
salary in private practice, [still] continue to give service and the immeasurable
benefit of their experience with a full calendar load to the benefit of their gov-
ernment, and not one penny more of additional pay.
Letter from author to Senator fansfield, Mar. 14, 1974.
4
aJudges' Bill, supra note 9, at § 2-102(c).
44Id. § 2-103(g)(1).
45 Commission's Bill, supra note 8, at § 2-101.
46 Id. § 2-210.
47See Coogan, The Proposed Bankruptcy Act of 1973: Questions for the Non-
Bankruptcy Business Lawyer, 29 Bus. LAw. 729, 733-34 (1974).
48 See Commission's Bill, supra note 8, at § 3-101 et seq. The Administrator would
have total authority over nonlitigated cases and nonlitigated issues, including many of the
functions now performed not only by referees but also by "trustees, auctioneers, appraisers,
receivers, accountants, and attorneys." Editorial Comment, Report of the Commission
on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, 29 Bus. LAw. 75, 91 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as Editorial Comment]. Under the Commission's Bill, the Administrator would gen-
erally act as trustee except in certain cases where the creditors would have the right to
elect a trustee. Commission's Bill, supra note 8, at § 4-301.
49 Commission's Bill, supra note 8, at §§ 3-101, 3-102. The comment following § 3-102
states that the section
provides for the appointment of a single executive to manage and direct the
Administration. To afford the administrator security of position conducive to
sound management of an independent government agency, he is to serve a term of
seven years, subject to removal by the President only for the causes indicated.
COMMISSION RwOir, supra note 6, pt. 1, at 52. See generally Hertzberg & Weingarten,
The Powers of the Administrator Under the Proposed Bankruptcy Act, 79 Com. L.J. 82
(1974); Weintraub & Levin, Chapter VII (Reorganizations) as Proposed by the Bankruptcy
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the Administrator of the Bankruptcy Administration would serve a
term of seven years and would be removable only by the President
and only for "neglect of duty or malfeasance but for no other cause." 50
The Administrator at his discretion would then appoint other officers
who would "serve at his pleasure." 51
Thus, the Commission wishes to add a new federal agency as well
as a new level of courts, resulting in the removal of a basically judicial
proceeding from judicial control.52 There is simply no valid reason for
such a radical and expensive change. An innovation of this nature
would be justified only if the current procedure were a total failure.
This is not the case. The court system now in effect is a basically
sound and well-functioning process flexible enough to allow for nec-
essary change via amendments. 53 In fact, there has been no demonstra-
tion by the Commission or any other authority, that the existing in-
adequacies in the bankruptcy procedure "are either inherently in, or
irreparable within, the judicial system." 54
It is unquestioned that significant portions of bankruptcy proceed-
ings are administrative in nature55 and that the administrative and
judicial functions could be better segregated than they are at the pres-
ent time. Nevertheless, the administrative aspects of the procedure are
not of such overriding importance that the judicial aspects should be
subordinated to them. Rather, the administrative functions are merely
aids to the primary responsibilities of the resolution of adverse inter-
ests. The underlying assumptions of the Commission's proposal to cre-
ate an independent administrative agency are in error, and the conclu-
sion that the proposed act would eliminate many of the problems it
seeks to correct must be met with great skepticism.50 Although the
Commission: The Widening Gap Between Theory and Reality, 47 Am. BArm. L.J. 323,
335 (1973).
50 Commision's Bill, supra note 8, at § 3-102(a).
51 Id. § 3-102(b).
52 The Board of Governors of the American Bar Association approved a resolution on
behalf of its members that stated emphatically that while there was a need to improve
the administrative aspects of bankruptcy proceedings, the process was primarily adversary
in nature and "should be retained within a judicial framework." Twinem, Bankruptcy
Report: Some Limitations on Creditors' Rights, 29 Bus. LAw. 353, 355 n.6 (1974).
53 See Weintraub & Levin, Chapter VII (Reorganizations) as Proposed by the Bank-
ruptcy Commission: The Widening Gap Between Theory and Reality, 47 Am. BANmX L.J.
323 (1973).
S4Levit, Bankruptcy Administration and the Brookings Report-A Critical Analysis,
77 Com. L.J. 179, 181 (1972).
55 A survey by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts showed that
referees spent about 22 percent of their time doing administrative work. Editorial Com-
ment, supra note 48, at 89.
56 Cf. Note, The Proposed Bankruptcy Act: Changes in the Absolute Priority Rule
for Corporate Reorganizations, 87 HAgv. L. REv. 1786, 1820 (1974).
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Judges' Bill also contemplates a separate administrative agency, it more
carefully preserves judicial functions within the judicial sphere.
The Commission would grant sweeping and unchecked discretion
to the Bankruptcy Administration.57 As Bankruptcy Judge Conrad K.
Cyr remarked:
I believe it is a mistake to bet on the jockey instead of the horse.
I would prefer to have the operational structure and the procedural
rules laid out in advance for all to evaluate, rather than gamble
that the "right" Administrator will be "in the saddle" to assure that
all of the "right" steps are taken. On this point, as on many
others, the Commission itself most eloquently refutes the stance it
assumes in the Bankruptcy Act of 1973.58
Initial Proceedings
One criticism of the current procedure is that it is so complex that
individual debtors are often totally cut off from effective relief, unless
aided at substantial cost by counsel.59 Under the Judges' Bill the Di-
rector of the Branch of Bankruptcy Administration would be available
to assist the debtor and make referrals to attorneys when necessary so
that the debtor would pay attorneys' fees only for the performance of
legal services and not bookkeeping chores. This service would be of-
fered to any non-self-employed person with a regular income or a nat-
ural person who "has income or assets which are inadequate to enable
him to pay normal charges for legal assistance" necessary to commence
a proceeding.A0 The Director's assistance would extend to the "prepa-
ration of the petition, schedules of assets and liabilities, a proposed
budget, and a statement of affairs.""' Under no circumstances may the
Director inquire about transfer of assets, repayment of loans and other
matters which would tend to affect the legal rights of the trustee to
recover assets or the right of the debtor to obtain discharge.62 These
would be left to the debtor's attorney.
After the initial documents are completed, the debtor would be
referred to an attorney, drawn from a court list of qualified persons,
for counseling on the types of relief available.0 3 The attorney would
57 See Cyr The Bankruptcy Act of 1973: Back to the Drafting Board, 48 Am. BANKR.
L.J. 45,54 (1974).
Gs Id. at 68.
59See Levit, Bankruptcy Administration and the Brookings Report-A Critical
Analysis, 77 Com. L.J. 179, 184 (1972).
GO Judges' Bill, supra note 9, at § 4-203(a), (b).
61Id. § 4-203(a).
62 Id.
63Id. §§ 4-203(b), (c).
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also prepare the debtor's disclosure statement." The action would then
be commenced by filing the petition with the bankruptcy court.
The Commission's Bill, however, merely provides that the Admin-
istrator shall counsel individuals with regular income as to the types
of relief available.65 This seemingly innocuous provision actually in-
volves a radical change from the present structure by totally eliminat-
ing private attorneys in some cases. As the Commission report notes:
The petitioner would not of course be precluded or discouraged
from consulting an attorney before filing.... It is contemplated
that he should be free to consult his private attorney before making
a choice after he has been counseled by the administrator. On the
other hand, it is not contemplated that he should be required to
have private counsel. He would in any event be entitled to receive
such counseling assistance from the administrator as might be neces-
sary to enable him to understand the practical implications of opt-
ing for a plan of composition or extension or straight bankruptcy.66
The dangers of the Commission's proposal become obvious when it is
remembered that the Administrator would, in effect, be acting as ref-
eree.67 In preparing and presenting his case the debtor needs the shield
of attorney-client privilege as provided by the Judges' Bill. The Com-
mission would have the individual debtor's case prepared by the same
staff that would then administer the claim after action is commenced
by filing the petition with the Administrator." "Attorneyless" bank-
ruptcy would not only endanger the rights of the debtor but also
would be detrimental to society as a whole. One commentator has noted:
By encouraging a debtor to proceed in bankruptcy and without
the assistance and guidance of a lawyer, a bankruptcy explosion
could result. The filing of a bankruptcy petition would become
... [like] ... filing an income tax return.... [D]ebtors could be
solicited for bankruptcy and do-it-yourself bankruptcy kits could
be sold .... 69
Exemption Provisions
The current system of exemptions is basically a total federal abdi-
cation to conflicting and outdated state exemption laws. 70 It has led
64 Id. § 4-203(b).
65 Commission's Bill, supra note 8, at § 4-203.
66 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 6, pt. I, at 160 (emphasis added).
67 Editorial Comment, supra note 48, at 91.
68 See Commission's Bill, supra note 8, at § 4-301 which provides that the Administra-
tor will also perform the duties presently assigned to the trustee.
69 Twinem, Bankruptcy Report: Some Limitations on Creditors' Rights, 29 Bus. LAw.
353, 354 (1974).
70 Bankruptcy Act § 6, 11 U.S.C. § 24 (1970) provides:
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to inconsistent and inequitable results.71 A too liberal exemption policy
may encourage irresponsible spending habits. Furthermore, the honest
debtor turned bankrupt is only entitled to a "fresh start" and never
a "head start."72 Both legislative proposals are too generous in this
respect, but the Judges' Bill is the more liberal of the two.
The Judges' Bill takes into account the differing needs of each
region of the country and attempts to allow for local variations of
exemptions. Under this bill the individual debtor, whether voluntary
or involuntary, may elect between the greater of a federal set of ex-
emptions or the exemption plan of the state of the debtor's domicile.73
The bill limits the total property exemptions under the federal plan
to a maximum of $25,000 but no ceiling is placed on the state plan. 4
The alternate federal plan gives a partial exemption for burial
plots and property used as the residence for the debtor or his depen-
dents.7 The residence exemption is limited to $6,000 with an addi-
tional $600 for each of the debtor's dependents. The debtor may exempt
life insurance policies that have a cash surrender value, except where
payable to himself, to the extent his aggregate exemptions are not in
excess of the residence limit.76 Life insurance policies with a cash sur-
This title shall not affect the allowance to bankrupts of the exemptions which
are prescribed by the laws of the United States or by the State laws in force at
the time of the filing of the petition ...
There are very few federal exemptions now in existence. Among them are proceeds of
libel and slander actions and life insurance policy cash surrender values. Bankruptcy
Act § 70, 11 U.S.C. § 110 (1970).
71 The exemption policies of the individual states are diverse and often the result
of nineteenth century needs. Note, Bankruptcy Exemptions: Critique and Suggestions,
68 YALE L.J. 1459, 1463 (1959). Typically, they are designed to favor special interest groups.
Id. at 1466. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 272.18(11) (1974) (printing presses); Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 85-3-1(o) (1972) (molasses mill and equipment).
72 Lines v. Frederick, 400 U.S. 18, 21-22 (1970) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Comment,
Bankruptcy -Bankrupt Retains Accrued Vacation Pay, 73 W. VA. L. Rev. 302, 308 (1971).
Mhe basic purpose of the Bankruptcy Act [is] to give the debtor a "new oppor-
tunity in life and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and
discouragement of preexisting debt."
Lines v. Frederick, 400 US. 18, 19 (1970), quoting Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234,
244 (1934).
73 Judges' Bill, supra note 9, at § 4-503(a).
74 Id.
75 Id. § 4-503(b).
76 Moreover, if the debtor takes no exemption for residence and insurance or the
aggregate value of the exemptions is less than the residence ceiling provided in § 4-503(b),
he may exempt such items as jewelry, clothes, furniture and cars as provided in § 4-503(e)
(1) up to such residence ceiling. Id. § 4-503(d). This would be over and above the
§ 4-503(e)(1) exemption for these same items.
This interpretation is premised on the author's belief that within § 4-503(d), pertain-
ing to the exemptions in lieu of homestead and insurance, there is a typographical error.
It is assumed where the statute reads "if no property is allowed as exempt under sub-
sections (a) or (b) of this section ... " it should read "(b) or (c)." As is, the reference to
subsections (a) or (b) would be meaningless since subsection (a) merely sets the bounds
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render value in excess of the residence ceiling may be protected from
creditors by paying the trustee an amount equal to the excess. 7" The
homestead, burial plot and life insurance exemptions are, in any event,
subject to the $25,000 ceiling. The Judges' Bill provides for additional
property exemptions up to the $25,000 limit for: 8
(1) Livestock, wearing apparel, jewelry, household furnishings, tools
of the trade or profession, and motor vehicles, to an aggregate
value of not more than $3,000.
(2) Cash, securities, and receivables, including unpaid personal
earnings, accrued vacation pay, and income tax refunds, to the
aggregate value of not more than $500.
(3) Payments of alimony, support, and separate maintenance.
(4) The identifiable proceeds or benefits from any life insurance
policy ....
(5) ... [S]uch rights as the debtor may have under a pension, an-
nuity, or similar plan ....
(6) Disability benefits.
(7) Proceeds, benefits, or other rights to which the debtor is entitled
as a result of any personal injury or unemployment.
(8) Health aids reasonably necessary to enable the debtor to work
or to sustain his health.79
Where the debtor dies after filing, a separate exemption would entitle
the surviving spouse and dependent children to an allowance of one
thousand dollars each out of estate property not yet distributed, re-
duced only by life insurance benefits received by that person in excess
of $10,000.80
Under the Judges' Bill no exemption may be taken under either
federal or state plans for "concealed or voluntarily transferred" prop-
erty which is subsequently recovered by the trustee unless the transfer
was made to secure a debt. In such a case, only the excess of value of
the transferred property over the debt so secured is eligible for exemp-
tion.81 The conversion of nonexempt property into an exempt form
of the exemptions and provides no specific property exemption per se. Furthermore,
subsection (d) is entitled "[e~xemption in lieu of homestead and insurance," to which
subsections (b) and (c) specifically address themselves.
77 1d. § 4-503(c). There is an existing federal exemption for life insurance policies.
Bankruptcy Act § 70(a)(5), 11 U.S.C. § 110(a)(5) (1970) provides in part:
[W]hen any bankrupt ... shall have any insurance policy which has a cash sur-
render value payable to himself . . . he may, within thirty days after the cash
surrender value has been ascertained ... pay or secure to the trustee the sum
... and continue to hold, own, and carry such policy free from the claims of
the creditors, otherwise the policy shall pass to the trustee as assets . ...
78Judges' Bill, supra note 9, at § 4-503(e). Value for exemptions would be fair market
value at the time of filing less all indefeasible liens. Id. § 4-503(i).
791 d. § 4-503(e).
SOld. § 4-503(g).
81 Id. § 4-5030).
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prior to filing of a petition would not affect the debtor's right to an
exemption unless the conversion amounted to an actual fraud. 2
The Commission's Act sets forth a similar scheme of exemptions,
but makes no provision for regional variation. Under the Commission's
plan, the state exemptions would be wholly abrogated and the federal
plan would uniformly apply regardless of regional differences and
needs.13 The Commission justified its provision with the following
comment:
The reference to nonbankruptcy law to determine the exemptions
is abandoned to eliminate diversity ... and because state exemp-
tion laws seem generally archaic and unduly generous in some states
and exceedingly niggardly, . . . in others.84
The Commission's stated goal is uniformity but what is needed is uni-
formity of result, which can only be achieved by allowing for some
form of regional differences. Individuals in high cost of living regions
would suffer a great hardship under dollar limits which are designed
for nationwide application. 5 A better system would allow for regional
adjustment of all dollar limitations. Likewise, fixed dollar amounts
cause inequities in a fluctuating economy. In present times, the infla-
tion rate is such that a dollar amount fixed at an equitable sum while
a bill is drafted could be obsolete by the time the bill is enacted., At
minimum, regular review of the sufficiency of dollar amounts must be
required. A preferable system would be one which automatically ties
any dollar amounts into economic changes,87 as measured by recog-
nized economic indicators. The technology exists to implement a so-
phisticated and regionalized system of economic indices which could
eliminate these inequitable results.88
The Judges' Bill has made at least some provisions to offset the
effects of fixed dollar amounts. Under the Judges' Bill the Director
of the Board of Bankruptcy Administration would make an adjustment
82 Id. § 4-5o3(Q.
83 See Commission's Bill, supra note 8, at § 4-503(b)(1).
84 COMMISSION REPoRT, supra note 6, pt. I, at 127.
85Seidman, The Bankruptcy Act of 1973-A Critique, 79 Com. LJ. 297 (1974).
8 Critics of the state exemption laws base their complaints on, among other things,
obsolete value limits. See, e.g., Countryman, For a New Exemption Policy in Bankruptcy,
14 RrTGEts L. REv. 678, 682-83 (1960); Note, Bankruptcy Exemptions: A Full Circle Back
to the Act of 1800?, 53 CoRNEL L. REv. 663, 669 (1968). See also Note, Bankruptcy
Exemptions: Critique and Suggestions, 68 YAL L.J. 1459, 1463 (1959).
87 See Joslin, Debtor's Exemption Laws: Time for Modernization, 34 IND. L.J. 355,
375-76 (1959).
88 Such a provision would strike a balance between the proposed uniform exemptions
and the state exemptions as they now stand, resulting in a freely equitable system, allow-
ing for the differences in the economics of the many geographic localities.
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of the dollar amounts every two years 9 on the basis of statutorily
defined economic indices.90 It does not, however, provide for regional
cost of living differences. Hopefully, whatever statute is finally enacted
will contain such a provision.
The specific exemptions suggested by the Commission are similar
in type to the exemptions provided by the Judges' Bill. Under the
Commission's Act, the homestead exemption is limited to $5,000 plus
$500 per dependent. The Commission gives a separate exemption for
life insurance with a cash surrender value of up to $1,500 and allows
for total exemption of life insurance policies if the debtor pays to the
trustee an amount equal to the excess in value over $1,500. 91 The
Commission also provides limited exemptions for certain personal
property items, as well as the debtor's burial plot.92
89 Judges' Bill, supra note 8, at § 1-105(b).
90 Id. § 1-105(a) provides:
The dollar amounts designated in this title shall be adjusted as provided in this
section according to and to the extent of changes in the Consumer Price Index
for Urban Wage Earners and Clerical Workers: United States City Average, All
Items, 1967 = 100, compiled by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, United States De-
partment of Labor, and hereafter referred to as the index. The index for
December 197- is the Reference Base Index. If the index is revised after Decem-
ber 197-, the adjustment pursuant to this section shall be calculated on the
basis of the revised index. If the index is superseded, the index referred to in
this section is one represented by the Bureau of Labor Statistics as reflecting
most accurately the changes in the purchasing power of the dollar for con-
sumers.
91 Commission's Bill, supra note 8, at § 4-503(d).
92 Id. § 4-503. Subsection (c) provides:
The following property shall be allowed as exempt in addition to any property
allowed as exempt under subdivision (b):
(I) livestock, wearing apparel, jewelry, household furnishings, tools of the trade
or profession, and motor vehicles, to the aggregate value of not more than $1,000;
(2) a burial plot to the value of $2,500;
(3) cash, securities, and receivables, including unpaid personal earnings, accrued
vacation pay, and income tax refund, to the aggregate value of not more than
$500;
(4) payments for alimony, support, and separate maintenance;
(5) the identifiable proceeds or benefits from any life insurance policy if the
debtor is the spouse or a dependent of the insured, to the extent the proceeds or
benefits are reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor and his de-
pendents;
(6) before or after retirement, such rights as the debtor may have under a profit
sharing, pension, stock bonus, annuity, or similar plan which is established for
the primary purpose of providing benefits upon retirement by reason of age,
health, or length of service, and which is either (A) qualified under section 4 01(a)
of the Internal Revenue Code, or any successor thereto, or (B) established by
federal or state statute, to the extent in either case the debtor's interest therein
is reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor and his dependents;
(7) disability benefits;
(8) proceeds, benefits, or other rights to which the debtor is entitled as a result
02 any personal injury or unemployment; and
(9) health aids reasonably necessary to enable the debtor to work or to sustain
his health.




Under current law, a discharge "releases" the debt, thus leaving
open the possibility of revival or reaffirmation.9 3 Both the Commission's
Act and the Judges' Bill provide that discharge "extinguishes" debts.
The Judges' Bill states specifically:
[N]otwvithstanding any... law to the contrary, a debt extinguished
by discharge... shall not be revived or reaffirmed or be all or part
of any bargain creating a new debt. Any judgment, whenever ob-
tained, that a debtor is personally liable to pay a debt extinguished
by discharge is null and void.9
The purpose behind extinguishment is to prevent creditors from co-
ercing a bankrupt into reafflirmance by threatening to refuse to extend
new credit.95 The purpose of the bankruptcy laws, namely, to give the
debtor a "fresh start," would be subverted by such behavior. Upon
initial consideration, such a change might seem beneficial to discharged
debtors; however, in practice the opposite may well result.
While a bankrupt may need protection against coercion, prohib-
iting the debtor from legally binding himself to a reaffirmation would
limit his available options. In the absence of a method whereby a dis-
charged debt can be reaffirmed, a creditor may, for valid reasons, refuse
to deal with the debtor again. Of course, it is no surprise that the
Brookings study found that one-third of the bankrupts interviewed
had a more difficult time obtaining credit after bankruptcy.96 How-
ever, two-thirds apparently did not experience this difficulty. The study
also found that one-third of all bankrupts had revived all or part of
their debts. A hypothesis worthy of testing is that there exists a sub-
stantial overlap between the latter two groups. Without the capacity
to reaffirm, the bankrupt may be effectively restrained from reestab-
93 Bankruptcy Act § 17(a), 11 U.S.C. § 35(a) (1970). Formerly, a creditor could collect
an unsecured debt after discharge of the debtor by bringing suit in a state court, alleging
fraud as a basis for exclusion of the debt from the discharge. Assertion of the discharge was
an affirmative defense, absent which judgment would be entered for the plaintiff-creditor
despite the bankruptcy. BROOKINGS REPORT, supra note 4, at 61. Remedy was found through
legislation. Bankruptcy Act § 17(c)(4), 11 U.S.C. § 35(c)(4) (1970). The bankruptcy courts
may now rule on the question of dischargeability in the event of such a suit. Id. "If the
claim is dischargeable, the creditor will be barred from pursuing the debtor further unless
the creditor is able to induce the discharged bankrupt to revive the obligation by a new
promise to pay." BROOKINGS REPORT, supra note 4, at 62 (emphasis added). See Country-
man. The New Dischargeability Law, 45 Am. BANKR. L.J. pt. I, 1 (1971).
94Judges' Bill, supra note 9, at § 4-507(a).
95 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 6, at 174-78.
96 BROOKINGS REPORT, supra note 4, at 63. See also H. JAcoB, DETORS IN CouRT 109-10
(1969), wherein over half the bankrupts surveyed had revived their debts.
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lishing himself in the economic community. In other words, instead
of a fresh start he would get no start. Moreover, payment of liabilities
incurred, whether or not legally enforceable, is a matter of social policy
to be encouraged, not restrained.
A better approach would be to combine the "release" provision
of the current law97 with a provision proscribing discrimination against
or coercion of bankrupts. The Judges' Bill contains an antidiscrimina-
don provision which states:
A person shall not be subjected to discriminatory treatment be-
cause he, or any person with whom he is or has been associated,
is or has been a debtor or has failed to pay a debt discharged in a
case under this title. This action does not preclude consideration,
where relevant, of factors other than those specified in the preceding
sentence, such as present and prospective financial condition or
managerial ability.98
Archaic as it may seem, some states still allow for imprisonment
of debtors.99 The Judges' Bill protects "[a] debtor by or against whom
a petition has been filed. . . from arrest" and further provides that
such person shall be "released from imprisonment on process issued
in any civil action to enforce collection of a debt that is or will be
provided for in a confirmed plan.., or that is dischargeable ....3-100
The Judges' Bill extinguishes all debts of an individual debtor
with specific exceptions parallel to the exceptions to discharge found
in the existing law.101 The exceptions include state and federal tax
liabilities which are given a priority and those tax liabilities arising
from failure to file a return, or for which a false or fraudulent return
has been fied, civil liabilities for larceny and embezzlement, alimony
and child support, liability for intentional torts, and debts respecting
certain educational loans. Discharge is denied only if the debtor en-
gaged in certain wrongful conduct, such as fraudulent transfer of prop-
erty or if he has obtained a discharge within five years prior to filing.1°2
97 Bankruptcy Act § 17(a), 11 U.s.C. § 35(a) (1970).
98 Judges' Bill, supra note 9, at § 4-508.
99 See Schuchman, An Attempt at a "Philosophy of Bankruptcy," 21 U.C.L.A.L. RV.
403, 414 (1978); Comment, Civil Arrest in North Carolina, 3 N.C. C.NT. L.J. 87 (1971);
Comment, Imprisonment for Debt in 1969, 4 NEw ENG. L. REV. 227 (1969).
100 Judges' Bill, supra note 9, at § 4-509.
201 Bankruptcy Act § 17, 11 U.S.C. § 35.
102 This provision is also generally similar to the existing law, with the exception





Admittedly, the periodic amendments to the Bankruptcy Act over
some 75 years have been a bandage attempt to keep abreast of changes
in attitude by the courts in expanding the jurisdiction of the Bank-
ruptcy Court, by the bar through its use of the Act as a professional
tool, and by the public in its approach to bankruptcy as a vehicle for
relief and protection. Still the major surgery attempted by the Com-
mission, because of its capitulation to Brookings, resulted in the pa-
tient being taken to the brink of oblivion. The injection of fresh
blood is necessary and, therefore, the many proposals for amendments
to the Commission's proposed Act, as well as the Judges' Bill, should
be carefully examined.
However, I have argued and lectured against a separate adminis-
trative branch primarily because of the czarist powers, of both an
administrative and judicial nature, which would be assigned to the
Administrator. More significantly, the exorbitant cost of implementing
the Commission's Act makes this proposal particularly impracticable.
I am constantly told that a separate administrative agency is inevitable,
but I cannot agree. I believe, as others do, that a less costly procedure
must be pursued. The Administrative Office of the United States Courts
has done an exemplary job in monitoring and guiding the bankruptcy
judges and their staffs in their administrative responsibilities. This
has all been possible within the budgetary allowances made by Con-
gress. Provisions should be made for additions to the present staffs of
the bankruptcy judges to enable them to render full assistance to per-
sons filing petitions, especially in consumer bankruptcies.
Codify the differences among the courts of appeals in matters of
substance. Give the Administrative Office whatever jurisdiction and
powers are deemed necessary to supervise the present system. Through
these modest reforms, the court will be made responsive to the needs
of the public. Oversimplistic? Perhaps. But essential reforms can be
achieved with little confusion or bureaucratic chaos and most impor-
tantly, in these unprecedented times of a recession-inflation, at a
cost much less than the 30 to 90 million dollars a year estimated as
necessary to administer the Commission's proposal. 103
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